There is the potential for the ammonia thirst (please don’t drink it) to surpass opportunities to build cost-effective capacity for the medium term. Consequently, the shortages we see today could extend and become more severe. Co-firing coal-based power facilities in Asia is one of the more obvious ways to start decarbonizing a predominantly coal-based power region. The experiments in Japan, if successful, will drive a step-change in demand for blue or green ammonia, and this should drive much more new capacity than we have seen announced to date. The power-based demand comes on top of expected growth in fertilizer-driven demand and a possible rise as a shipping fuel. The issue for investors is that green ammonia at scale is economically challenging, especially with the recent shortfalls in renewable power generating plans and what now looks like rising power costs for a while. Blue ammonia is much easier to think about at scale, but we are still hamstrung by expensive carbon capture costs and a lack of incentives – either in terms of tax breaks or taxes or in terms of a customer willing to pay more, to get most ideas and plans past the “wouldn’t it be nice” phase. In the meantime, as indicated above, installed ammonia capacity is making abnormal returns.
Braskem’s green polyethylene is an interesting niche opportunity, but we question how big the market might be for a product where you need the buyer to agree to prices that cover your costs – i.e. how many buyers will potentially pay up. In a $100 per barrel crude oil environment, polyethylene from sugar cane likely looks quite attractive, but probably less so in a $50 crude environment. Sugar cane-based ethanol has a cost advantage over corn-based ethanol, and one of the key questions for Braskem is how do you grow the business outside Brazil, where the barriers to entry for others are not much different. We do not doubt the demand potential for green polyethylene and other ethylene derivatives, but our concerns would be how to profitably grow the business, especially if there is a lower crude oil price backdrop. Today it is easy to make a bull case for oil – we do so above – but note that oil forecasting is not our strength and nor is it anyone else’s – based on hindsight. Paying a 20% premium over fossil fuel-based polymers may make sense for some packagers with meaningful ESG goals, but a 100% premium is likely unstable.
The carbon capture plans lacking a place to put the CO2, suggested in the two connected stories linked here (link 1, link 2), echo something that we have been highlighting for a while. There have been several press releases with respect to CCS – partnerships – plans to accompany new investments – gathering schemes for the ethanol industry, etc. but none have any specificity around where they will put the CO2. The Houston team, discussed in a recent report is talking about offshore Texas, and given both ExxonMobil and Chevron in the partnership, we do not doubt that there is a plan, but in general, the permit activity at the EPA is, we understand, quite limited today. To apply for a class 6 permit, applicants need to have a detailed analysis of the sub-surface that they plan to target, and once you have identified a location, there are likely at least 18 months of work to get into shape to submit the permit. Some of the oil majors may be able to move faster on acreage that they already have seismic models for, but it is a long process – we wrote about the need for 45Q to change in both value and duration in our recent ESG and Climate Piece.
The Navigator CCS announcement is extraordinary in its boldness and potential lack of any real chance of economic success. The idea of building 1200 miles of high-pressure CO2 pipe (See exhibit below) to collect small volumes from corn-based ethanol producers and potentially have multiple sequestration sites is extremely expensive and would not begin to be covered by the 45Q tax credit, which would easily be consumed by the compression and pipeline costs alone. If some of the ethanol is making it into the LCFS markets, each ethanol producer that has some material heading that way will want a piece of the pie and if each had to jointly file with CARB, with Navigator, for what would be small portions of the overall ethanol output, the administration might be overwhelming, as would be a chain of custody process which satisfies CARB. Navigator is not an altruist fund and consequently, must see a way to make a return on the idea. This may be based on the hope that LCFS or something like it will spread to other states.