There was a very strong focus at the WPC on the need for carbon pricing in the US to facilitate investment decisions around many initiatives focused on carbon abatement. The consensus was very much that a carbon price – so a cap and trade system like they have in Europe – was the best mechanism, and far more likely to drive action and limit inflation than a carbon tax. This is something that we broadly agree with but the US is a bit late to the game and the right caps need to be set so that CO2 prices don’t languish at very low levels for years, as they did in Europe. Jim Fitterling of Dow was somewhat provocative in his comments around nuclear power, but we see this as part of a broader initiative aimed at getting a serious dialogue moving around how we make the practical steps needed to drive carbon lower. Nuclear power provides stable baseload and is carbon-free – a small modular nuclear reactor could generate enough steam and enough power to drive the decarbonization of major chemical complexes – one investment for example could transform one of the larger Dow sites. If we are going to get to net-zero targets without nuclear, we need much more progressive policies – especially around carbon pricing – which is likely the direction that Dow would like to take the discussion.
The Evonik discussion around CO2 prices is both relevant and important as CO2 values will be a critical component of investment decisions for many industries going forward. Those waiting for explicit guidance on CO2 prices are likely to be disappointed as we are not seeing much global coordination today and as we discussed yesterday, the European market, which had been the better indicator in our view over the last 18 months, has collapsed in the wake of the Russia/Ukraine conflict as some countries ask for it be suspended, while speculators are assuming that lower gas supplies into Europe will lead to lower emissions and less demand for credits. One of the options here is to take the bp approach and assume a carbon price in investment decisions. Early last year, bp indicated that it would fix on a carbon price of $100 per ton in its longer-term planning. We believe that this is a ballpark steady-state for CO2 pricing but that traded prices could be quite volatile around that level, depending on the mechanisms used. But even if we have a consistent carbon price, we will see significant changes in industry costs and competitive cost curves based on the various costs of carbon abatement. We have written in the past that we could see huge benefits to the US manufacturing base because of the combination of relatively low-cost hydrocarbons and relatively low-cost CCS opportunities. By contrast, we see costs rising steeply in places like central West Europe, where the local CCS opportunity is off the table. Even if Europe can produce cost-effective blue hydrogen on the coast, getting it to central Europe will be an issue. The landscape is less clear in Asia, but we expect to see some competitive edge for countries with low-cost CCS options – Malaysia, Indonesia, Thailand, and parts of China. See more in today's daily.
The linked Canada headline supports one of the themes that we have been highlighting for a while, which is that certainty around carbon pricing is likely to drive investment rather than discourage it. Canada, and specifically Alberta, has seen several new investments announced over the last few months because manufacturers can now add some certainty around carbon values to other advantages offered by the province, including cheap natural gas and what appears to be low-cost CCS opportunities. We are also seeing investments shape up in Europe – also to produce low carbon materials and fuels – and this is also driven by greater certainty around carbon value. The lack of a carbon price in the US is becoming a competitive disadvantage for the country and those opposing it in government are, in our view, very misguided. If China can develop a credible and broad carbon pricing mechanism, it will also likely gain investment dollars, possibly at the expense of the US. Not having a sound climate change and carbon value framework in the US is a major threat to many of the reshoring initiatives that US retailers and manufacturers would like to see.
When China announced its 2060 net-zero goals we dedicated one of our ESG and Climate pieces to the topic - China: A Challenge With 2060 Goal But Also A Possible Edge - concluding that this would likely drive considerable competitive advantage for China assuming that others would bear the costs of new technology learning curves and China would get the solutions more cheaply. In interim China would have lower costs of manufacturing because of the delayed net-zero implementation. With the Biden administration now pushing for a coordinated 2050 commitment for the US, some of the burdens of early costs that China could benefit from also fall on the US. In one of the headlines (from today's report), there is criticism of the European CBAM and questions around whether it could work. The reality is that it, or something like it, has to work, otherwise asymmetric climate policies will create pockets of competitive advantage - potentially very damaging to those spending more.
In our ESG and Climate piece yesterday we briefly discussed the mid-west carbon capture projects, questioning their economic viability. Two of the most expensive components of any CCS project are pipelines and compression costs and we cannot see how a long network of pipe in the mid-west to pick up what are essentially small volumes can work economically. These projects are reliant on very high LCFS-like credits, and as we showed in last week’s report, LCFS credits have fallen this year and could fall further. The pipeline right of way issue is another major hurdle and we have seen growing resistance to pipelines of any sort over the last few years. Those who oppose CCS in principle could cripple these mid-west plans simply by co-opting enough land-owners on the path of the proposed pipelines and refusing access. We are supporters of CCS, but have done substantial work on economics and show that the process only begins to make economic sense if the sequestration is close to the emissions. Relying on possible artificially high carbon prices to justify the projects will only lead to pain, assuming the pipeline right of ways can be obtained.
In our ESG and Climate report tomorrow we are focusing on the very wide range of carbon prices and the structures of the various emission reduction incentive schemes, with a focus on what it does to the competitive landscape within the impacted markets. For example, with the government subsidy being offered to BASF and Air Liquide for the CCS project in Antwerp, some level of competitive edge will be granted to the companies, because similar subsidies might not be available to others. Last week we discussed the very wide range of potential carbon abatement costs for companies in the same business, driven by technology and geography. If we add to that the potential for some projects to attract subsidies, while others do not, we change the landscape of the competitive playing field. Could we, for example, see BASF shutter production in Germany, where abatement costs are high, and move more manufacturing to Antwerp – something likely to be very unpopular with the German government and trade unions. This is more problematic in Europe because of the open trade policy. For Germany to give the same benefit that BASF has at Antwerp to chemical manufacturers in Germany could be prohibitively expensive given the much higher inland costs of CCS in Europe, assuming any permits would be issued. Alternatives to CCS, such as the electrification of industrial heating processes or the use of hydrogen as fuel might be equally expensive. We see some of the select European subsidies possibly causing discord between the member states.
We want to focus today on the headlines around the possible increase in the 45Q CCS credit in the US and discuss the false logic of those that are objecting to it. There is no scenario where the US can move to a lower emissions power and transport profile while avoiding runaway inflation and social disorder without the continued use of fossil fuel-based power and transportation fuels for decades. The reliance on these fuels should and will decline over the years, but it is unreasonable to expect a transition that causes it to stop overnight. In the meantime, CCS is a mechanism that would allow fossil fuels to play a part with a much lower emissions footprint, and given that the CO2 impact on global warming is cumulative, if we can capture and store several billion tons of CO2 underground over that transition period it should be a good thing. Members of the Sierra Club and others would do well to look at the energy inflation problems in Europe and the move this week to put natural gas and nuclear back in the energy transition mix (too late in our view) because the move to renewables cannot keep pace with demand, which will grow faster as more EVs hit the road. The proposed 45Q credit is shown in the chart below vs. the current credit, the LCFS credit, and estimates of CCS costs.
It is worth a short explanation of what is going on with European CO2, given the mixed signals of shortages in headlines today and then the slight weakness in pricing shown in the image below. These are two very different markets, with the food, beverage, medical and nuclear industries looking for pure streams of CO2 rather than the contaminated streams that make up the bulk of emissions. Historically, the food and beverage industry looked to fermentation – so alcohol production – as its source of a pure CO2 stream, but as demand grew, the next best place became ammonia production, which also has a pure CO2 stream as a by-product. Most ammonia is further converted into urea, which is a consumer of CO2 and there is not enough CO2 produced in a natural gas-based ammonia plant to convert all of the ammonia to urea. You sometimes see urea facilities also selling ammonia, but more frequently they take the carbon monoxide by-product of the syngas reaction and convert that to CO2. The result is enough CO2 to convert all of the ammonia to Urea and surplus CO2 to sell. Because of this more dominant supply of food and beverage grade CO2, and shutdowns caused in this case by runaway natural gas prices, have an immediate impact on the industries that rely on the CO2.
Europe is likely to be a test case of how much inflation a country or region is willing to bear on its path to clean energy. Costs are rising in Europe, as LNG markets tighten and as carbon prices rise. The net result is increased power prices, with reports of unhappiness in many countries – this is a topic we have discussed at length in our dedicated ESG and climate work and was a focus of last week's report – linked here.
We have maintained all year that the strength in the European carbon price is sustainable and that it should go even higher and consequently, we are not surprised by this week’s move, even if much of the impetus is speculation. The European price is still not high enough to justify unsubsidized CCS or widespread renewable power investments to replace carbon-heavy energy sources, especially as renewable power costs rise. We estimate that a price in the €85-100 per metric ton range would be needed to stimulate investment, but because of the structure of the European market prices could overshoot this level meaningfully and be quite volatile until the level of abatement spending accelerates. When we start seeing investments in Europe to lower carbon that are not highly subsidized by local governments (in addition to the incentive of the carbon price) we will have a better guide around where 45Q needs to go in the US (or other mechanisms) to get investments rolling. Our analysis suggests that the US has some lower-cost abatement opportunities than Europe, especially on the CCS front, but not by much. For more on carbon costs and prices see today's ESG & Climate report.