The IEA CO2 emissions data is not a surprise as it has been telegraphed for a while by several commentators that the world went backward in 2021. There were several causes, not least of which was an economy which, with the benefit of hindsight, was overstimulated, pushing up demand for resources in general, including energy. There has also been an overestimation of the rate of investment in renewable power, something which is finally gaining attention more generally, triggered by the energy supply fears that have emerged from the Russia/Ukraine conflict. It will take time to make the very large investments needed to abate the CO2 associated with industrial and consumer activity and there is no overnight fix. Accommodative policies are needed today for investments that will start a decline in emissions several years from now.
The Evonik discussion around CO2 prices is both relevant and important as CO2 values will be a critical component of investment decisions for many industries going forward. Those waiting for explicit guidance on CO2 prices are likely to be disappointed as we are not seeing much global coordination today and as we discussed yesterday, the European market, which had been the better indicator in our view over the last 18 months, has collapsed in the wake of the Russia/Ukraine conflict as some countries ask for it be suspended, while speculators are assuming that lower gas supplies into Europe will lead to lower emissions and less demand for credits. One of the options here is to take the bp approach and assume a carbon price in investment decisions. Early last year, bp indicated that it would fix on a carbon price of $100 per ton in its longer-term planning. We believe that this is a ballpark steady-state for CO2 pricing but that traded prices could be quite volatile around that level, depending on the mechanisms used. But even if we have a consistent carbon price, we will see significant changes in industry costs and competitive cost curves based on the various costs of carbon abatement. We have written in the past that we could see huge benefits to the US manufacturing base because of the combination of relatively low-cost hydrocarbons and relatively low-cost CCS opportunities. By contrast, we see costs rising steeply in places like central West Europe, where the local CCS opportunity is off the table. Even if Europe can produce cost-effective blue hydrogen on the coast, getting it to central Europe will be an issue. The landscape is less clear in Asia, but we expect to see some competitive edge for countries with low-cost CCS options – Malaysia, Indonesia, Thailand, and parts of China. See more in today's daily.
As we have mentioned before, we see a couple of major challenges with the CO2 pipelines proposed for the mid-West, one of which is summarized in the Exhibit below. The first issue is pipeline right-of-ways, as there are already activists determined to oppose the pipelines, and opposition to pipelines has been a core them of the last 10 years. The second issue is cost. Carbon abatement is a cost for all looking for solutions and even where incentives exist, such as the 45Q program or the LCFS fuels program, the challenge will still be creating a path with the lowest. Compression and pumping costs are high for CO2, especially if the pipeline wants a pressure that will allow for direct injection into a series of wells. Lower pressure transportation by pipe is inefficient and raises the capital cost of the pipeline – so it becomes a trade-off – CAPEX vs OPEX. $4.5 billion of investment – as suggested by Summit – is $375 per annual ton of carbon dioxide sequestered - $37per ton assuming 10-year straight-line payback – twice that if you want a 10% return. This is before a dollar of OPEX and pipeline costs could easily exceed another $30+ per ton, with separation and purification of the CO2 stream also not free. Unless the ethanol producers are paying Summit and Navigator to take the CO2, the math becomes very challenging. See today's daily report and our weekly ESG and Climate report for more.
The most notable news from the Iceland CO2 direct air capture (DAC) project, illustrated in the Exhibit below, is not that it is working and how energy efficient it is, but that the CO2 capture costs are extremely high and yet all of the offsets are sold. One report talks about the costs per credit approximating $1000 per ton of CO2, which is likely accurate given that the facility is relatively small scale, at 4 thousand metric tons per year. The same report also states that the credits are almost sold out for the 12 years that they are being offered. We believe that this is indicative of the marginal demand for uncontestable carbon offsets, and this is a topic we have covered at length in our ESG and climate work. Shell, bp, and others are selling what they claim to be carbon neutral hydrocarbons around the world and are buying offsets to do so, but they are coming under quite a lot of “greenwashing” fire because of the less tangible/auditable nature of the credits they are buying – often related to agricultural or specific tree conservation/planting initiatives that are questioned because of the validity of the capture claim or the vulnerability of the credit to weather, fires, and forest maintenance years in the future.
Last week, and in our dedicated ESG and climate report this week, we talked about the challenges of shipping hydrogen, and the linked bp project for Western Australia will have the same problem to solve – choosing ammonia according to the announcement over the very inefficient toluene/cyclohexane option we discussed last week. The appeal of Western Australia is the unpopulated available land that has little alternative use and sees abundant sunshine. The bp project assumes that the facility can buy attractively priced renewable power from third parties, but the company must have a specific power project in mind for the bulk of the electricity needed. The stumbling block here will likely be when the power project(s) bid out the solar module contract, find out that the suppliers are sold out and are asking higher prices to cover reinvestment and higher material prices, and then have to go back to bp with a much higher than expected cost of power. The advantage of solar and wind projects is that inflation only impacts upfront capital costs, which can be amortized over the life of the project – feedstocks are free! That said, most of the announced projects have declining capital costs per megawatt in their planning assumptions today.
We have maintained all year that the strength in the European carbon price is sustainable and that it should go even higher and consequently, we are not surprised by this week’s move, even if much of the impetus is speculation. The European price is still not high enough to justify unsubsidized CCS or widespread renewable power investments to replace carbon-heavy energy sources, especially as renewable power costs rise. We estimate that a price in the €85-100 per metric ton range would be needed to stimulate investment, but because of the structure of the European market prices could overshoot this level meaningfully and be quite volatile until the level of abatement spending accelerates. When we start seeing investments in Europe to lower carbon that are not highly subsidized by local governments (in addition to the incentive of the carbon price) we will have a better guide around where 45Q needs to go in the US (or other mechanisms) to get investments rolling. Our analysis suggests that the US has some lower-cost abatement opportunities than Europe, especially on the CCS front, but not by much. For more on carbon costs and prices see today's ESG & Climate report.
The Navigator CCS announcement is extraordinary in its boldness and potential lack of any real chance of economic success. The idea of building 1200 miles of high-pressure CO2 pipe (See exhibit below) to collect small volumes from corn-based ethanol producers and potentially have multiple sequestration sites is extremely expensive and would not begin to be covered by the 45Q tax credit, which would easily be consumed by the compression and pipeline costs alone. If some of the ethanol is making it into the LCFS markets, each ethanol producer that has some material heading that way will want a piece of the pie and if each had to jointly file with CARB, with Navigator, for what would be small portions of the overall ethanol output, the administration might be overwhelming, as would be a chain of custody process which satisfies CARB. Navigator is not an altruist fund and consequently, must see a way to make a return on the idea. This may be based on the hope that LCFS or something like it will spread to other states.