Despite all of the rhetoric about the need for green hydrogen, we see most of the large ammonia producers pursuing large blue projects – with Nutrien’s announcement yesterday coming on the heels of a CF new facility announcement and the CO2 capture project announced by LSB a couple of weeks ago. While there are some small (proof of concept) green projects in the works, they are very small, tiny when compared with the ammonia need, whether to replace lost material from Russia and Ukraine or whether to supply what could be substantial needs in Asia to co-fire coal plants, or as a shipping fuel, or as a carrier for hydrogen (see third chart below). The ammonia majors are not waiting around for “green” economics to improve as they see meaningful near-term demand that cannot wait for scale efficiencies of available power on the green side. Large-scale sources of cheap renewable power are hard to find, and where they may exist, there is competition from uses that may be able to pay more.
The renewable power space is heading for a very bad year in the US and Europe, as supply chain issues and raw material inflation will impact not only the amount of business that gets completed, but also the margin on that business. The trade issues between the US and China on solar panels have essentially brought the industry to a halt for the moment and suggests that all forecasts of the growth in renewable power contributions in the US in 2022 are too high, and consequently demand estimates for natural gas and coal for power generation are too low – see out comments in the energy section of today's daily report. The EIA forecast below likely fails to take into account the current woes and if governments, at the federal and the state levels act on the information in the chart they may be unprepared for some power shortages later in the year. Overestimation of the rate of renewable power installation as well as its operating rate is responsible for many of the current power shortages that we see in most regions.
Looking at the Bloom results and reflecting on our many recent client discussions, the low-cost providers of fuel cells and electrolyzers are going to win disproportionately in our view, but whether that is Bloom or others remains to be seen. Lower costs will come with scale, and this should allow the leaders to stay ahead, especially if they control their equipment production as Bloom does. The negative for Bloom is that its equipment production is in the US, which may add costs, but the positive is that it is on-shore and this gives the company more control over delivery in the US. Companies that can scale quickly in this space and other renewable sectors, should see the benefit of economies of scale and this should drive more wins and more economies.
We are seeing a flood of CCUS announcements in the US in 2022, but they look like “gathering” exercises at this stage rather than projects that are ready for FID. Companies are chasing potential pore space and, like Talos, leasing onshore and offshore (mainly offshore) acreage, where they believe opportunities exist to sequester CO2. These announcements sometimes include firm commitments from companies that have CO2 surpluses and sometimes are more speculative. At this stage, it seems like a “land grab” and “customer grab”. There is wide agreement that the incentive structure in the US – centered around the 45Q tax credit scheme – is not enough to drive much real investment, unless it can be stacked with other credits like the LCFS structure, which only applies to fuels in California today. We see the land grab as relatively low-cost and low-risk positioning in the hope that incentives or economics change. There are some instances where investments will go ahead, and these will focus on processes that have a reasonably low cost of carbon capture – fermentation, urea, natural gas clean-up for LNG, and a handful of other processes. The LSB Industries announcement for Arkansas, highlighted this week, is likely an example of where the economics work even if LSB cannot get much of a premium for the low-carbon urea.
We discussed the woes of the wind power industry at length in a dedicated ESG and Climate piece last week, and the Vestas results below play into the same theme. The company is cutting guidance again for 2022, which is already much lower than estimates would have suggested 6 months ago. While Siemens Gamesa has the added headache of a mismanaged platform change, all of the issues raised by Vestas are shared industry wide, delayed installations because of supply chain issues and material shortages, as well as significant cost inflation. In tomorrow’s ESG and Climate report we discuss some of the increases in European PPAs in 1Q 2022, reversing a multi-year trend of lower installed costs of power. This reversal will likely impact plans for 2022 and 2023, especially for those banking on lower power costs to justify many of the announced hydrogen ventures – particularly in Europe. Those who press ahead despite higher power costs and higher construction costs in general, may stretch both balance sheets and borrowing capacity.
Methane emissions are one of the more challenging carbon equivalent problems in part because it is lots of small emitters, associated with many thousands of wells and many thousands of miles of pipelines, rather than a large source of CO2 that can be eliminated with a specific investment. The API carbon tax, proposed last week, has a condition in the proposal that would prevent any other emission-based legislation for many years to evaluate the effect of the tax. This will not drive lower methane emissions unless it is a broad carbon “equivalent tax”, which could potentially drive a very punitive tax on methane and would get an almost instant response from those that own the wells and the pipes. Some of the abatement solutions are easier than they first appear and all pipeline operators should look at the technology offered by Pipeotech, for example. Wellhead emissions are more problematic but not beyond the engineering skills that exist within the major E&P companies. The harder problem is what to do with emissions from abandoned wells – here the tax idea would not work as there is no one to pay the tax and a fairly complex financial structure would be needed to encourage someone to take on the role of cleaning up these properties. That said, all these pathways will need to be explored to get to the targets outlined below.
Anyone who read our ESG and Climate reports of the last two weeks will know that we do not believe in the hydrogen projections below as we see renewable power as a potentially scarce resource. Furthermore and also covered yesterday, should the API be successful with its carbon tax proposal in the US and should this be additive to the 45Q incentive for CCS, we could see an explosion of blue hydrogen investments in the US, especially on the Gulf Coast.
The CCS spending chart below is quite detailed, but shows the limited amount of spending in 2021 and 2022 and may underestimate the amount of seismic spending needed, especially in the US, as companies prepare permit applications. We do not expect to see much spending in the US before mid-decade beyond permit applications. However, as we discuss in today’s ESG and Climate report, should the API proposed carbon tax, or something similar, be additive to the 45Q tax credit, we could see a step-change in CCS when/if the tax is approved. The tax on its own is likely not enough to drive decarbonizing investment, but when added to 45Q it could be a specific trigger for CCS investment, and we could see a step-change in the second half of the decade. This might involve large-scale blue hydrogen production, especially on the Gulf Coast to decarbonize the refining and chemical industries.
Shell issued its 2021 energy transition progress this morning and the report contains a lot of detail about what Shell has done so far and what the company intends to do. The report is a record of progress and intent and is targeting both general stakeholders as well as the Shell board and annual meeting, where approval of the plan will be sought. When compared with other reports we have seen from other companies, this summary is comprehensive. It provides some concrete steps to achieving emission goals in 2030 – exhibit below - while remaining appropriately vague about getting to 2040 and 2050 targets. However, we would note how much portfolio changes likely added to the 2016 to 2021 progress – likely proportionately much more than they are expected to contribute from 2022 to 2030. Both renewable power and CCS figure in the 2030 projections below and Shell will need to get moving on the CCS front of it is to sequester 3-6 million tons of CO2 per annum by 2030. The expectations are likely based on the European offshore projects, as it may take longer than 8 years to get permits and investments in place in the US. The US could move faster but the EPA would likely need to grant primacy to at least Louisiana and Texas for things to speed up and we are not convinced that this will happen soon. Like many of the other company 2030 plans that we have seen, it is likely that much of Shell’s progress will come in the last couple of years of the decade – especially on CCS.
Given the lead time to get some of the emission abatement projects in place – whether it be renewable power or hydrogen with carbon capture – many of the 2030 goals that we see, like the LyondellBasell chart below – are likely to be just that – plans for 2030, with not much in the years in between. We see very little CCS coming online in the US over the next 5 years because of permitting and because of the lead time for any large hydrogen or power project that might be associated with the CCS. Not too many companies seem interested in cleaning up existing CO2 streams and are more interested in building alternative capacity that generates easier to capture CO2 – such as hydrogen from an ATR. These are expensive and long lead-time projects. LyondellBasell, ExxonMobil, Dow, and others might meet their 2030 targets but it might all happen in 2029/30.