The CO2 emissions chart from the EIA should not be a surprise as the step-up in 2021 and 2022 is a recovery from the economic contraction and habit changes associated with COVID, and the projected increases in 2021 and 2022 are combined lower than the step down in 2020, suggesting that the trend is still negative. The problem is that the trend is not negative enough and as we have written about at length, it will not trend lower fast enough without all corrective opportunities at play – more renewable power, more conservation, and a lot of CCS. See our ESG and Climate work for more.
Last week, and in our dedicated ESG and climate report this week, we talked about the challenges of shipping hydrogen, and the linked bp project for Western Australia will have the same problem to solve – choosing ammonia according to the announcement over the very inefficient toluene/cyclohexane option we discussed last week. The appeal of Western Australia is the unpopulated available land that has little alternative use and sees abundant sunshine. The bp project assumes that the facility can buy attractively priced renewable power from third parties, but the company must have a specific power project in mind for the bulk of the electricity needed. The stumbling block here will likely be when the power project(s) bid out the solar module contract, find out that the suppliers are sold out and are asking higher prices to cover reinvestment and higher material prices, and then have to go back to bp with a much higher than expected cost of power. The advantage of solar and wind projects is that inflation only impacts upfront capital costs, which can be amortized over the life of the project – feedstocks are free! That said, most of the announced projects have declining capital costs per megawatt in their planning assumptions today.
In our ESG and climate piece yesterday we discussed rising costs of climate-related actions, with a focus on some of the likely inflation in renewable power costs. The optimists are looking at the Exhibit below, and what were falling module costs through 2020, and concluding that solar installations can grow and that costs can still fall. While the module shipment growth in 2020 was impressive at 33%, some of the forecasts of what will be needed call for a much more dramatic rate of module growth than we saw in 2020.
The exhibit below highlights one of the more significant constraints for green hydrogen, which is that the abundant low-cost power opportunities (strong wind and lots of sunshine) are often not where demand for hydrogen exists and the challenge is how to transport it. The problem with reacting it to make something else and then recovering it at the point of use or a distribution hub is that hydrogen is very light and you end up moving a lot of something else to get a little hydrogen. Air Products is looking at making ammonia in Saudi Arabia and shipping the liquid ammonia and the project below is looking at using toluene as a carrier in what appears to be a closed-loop with toluene moving one way and methylcyclohexane moving the other way. The liquid shipping would be cheap, but with the MCH route, only 5% of what you would be moving to Japan would be the green hydrogen. Using ammonia the green hydrogen content is slightly less than 18%, but you have to make the nitrogen on-site. The cost of making the nitrogen would be a function of the local cost of power and these remote locations should have very low-cost renewable power. In the example below, the opportunity is likely unique to the refinery structure and shipping opportunity and we doubt that it is easily replicated in a way that would be more economic than shipping ammonia or shipping compressed hydrogen itself.
Source: H2 Bulletin, August 2021
We are back on one of our pet topics today which is the reasonableness around some of the assumptions around the future cost of renewable power. We reference, work done by the US Department of Energy in the Exhibit below, and see two potential pitfalls with the assumptions around continuous improvement in solar, wind, and hydrogen costs, although there is a slight twist for hydrogen. The first is around the dynamics of learning curves. As the exhibit shows, in the early stages of any product development, there are huge leaps in cost improvements, driven by scale, better know-how, more efficient manufacturing, and in the case of solar power, both better processes for installation and some technology improvements. However, as you drive costs lower, the cost of raw materials becomes a much larger component of overall costs, and your ability to lower costs further can be overwhelmed by moves in material costs. Any inability to pass on the costs will result in economics that do not justify additional capital and you find yourselves in a commodity cycle. This is something that we have seen in basic polymers for decades, and no buyer of polyethylene today can claim that they are benefiting from a learning curve improvement. Closer to home for solar, we are seeing the same issue today in semiconductors – not enough margin to invest as everyone has been trying to push costs lower. The expectation in the DOE study and highlighted in the CNBC take on the study below is that annual solar installations in the US need to rise by 3-4X to meet some of the renewable power goals the Biden Administration is looking for by 2030, while similar growth is expected in other markets – the solar panel and other component makers have to be making good money to achieve this.
It is hard to ignore the number of headlines on hydrogen initiatives, today, highlighted in our ESG and climate report, as well as the acceleration in project announcements over the last several months. In the 80s in the UK, it was trendy to drive a VW Golf GTI – everyone had to have one – hydrogen has the same feel today – everyone has to have a project. The projects vary and fall into a handful of categories:
We are increasingly concerned that the US will remain a laggard concerning climate change initiatives given the major challenges of moving to the next steps and the bifurcated congressional views. The emissions reductions that the US has seen over the last 10 years have been more happenstance than planning, with the abundance of natural gas following the shale boom of the last decade creating economic reasons to replace coal-fired power with natural gas rather than environmental reasons. Lower costs for wind and solar power and focused industrial demand for that clean power have been the bigger driver of clean power investments. In the chart below, the decline in emission from the power sector is evident and it should continue. The diagram below shows sources and uses for US emissions in 2020, but the accompanying write-up talks about the step down in emissions overall in 2020. Except for the continuing electric power transition, most of the other 2020 declines are COVID-related and are expected to rebound in the near term, especially transport. The market share gains of EVs are not significant enough yet to make a difference. See more in today's daily report.
While the escalation in solar panel material costs has plateaued over the last couple of months, the increase has been enough already to reverse the decline in solar module pricing as we have noted previously (see charts below). While the increase in module pricing is not that significant there are three points to note:
The table below is from an interesting analysis published by the EIA this week that focuses on possible power demand scenarios for the US – all weather-related – and then backs into the power sources that would be needed to meet the demand, concluding with the US carbon emissions that would correspond to each scenario. The conclusions should not be surprising, which are that carbon emissions rise disproportionately faster as power demand rises – as more coal is required to balance generation needs, and fall disproportionately more quickly as power demand falls (as less coal is needed). The analysis is effectively a study of how much less CO2 emissions are using natural gas to generate power versus coal. As renewable generation increases as a share of the total, however, the math will change, and the EIA study does not take into account the weather factor on renewable power, it looks at cooling degree days and heating degree days at a national level only. This is reasonable as there is likely not enough data to be able to put good reliability estimates yet around renewable power annual volatility and more importantly, the impact of weather on renewable power is likely to be short-term in nature. Perhaps this analysis could be improved by adding a “daily risk band” around each scenario, showing how much renewable power volatility could cause peaks in the high scenario and lows in the low, etc.
